Regional Sustainability
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 1

2021

Co-management of small-scale fishery in the Tonle Sap Lake,
Cambodia
Serey Sok
a Research Office, Royal University of Phnom Penh, Russian Federation Boulevard, Phnom Penh, 12150,
Cambodia

Xiaojiang Yu
b School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Sydney, 2006, Australia

Follow this and additional works at: https://egijournals.researchcommons.org/regional-sustainability
Part of the Human Geography Commons

Recommended Citation
Sok, Serey and Yu, Xiaojiang (2021) "Co-management of small-scale fishery in the Tonle Sap Lake,
Cambodia," Regional Sustainability: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, 1-11.
DOI: 10.1016/j.regsus.2020.12.002
Available at: https://egijournals.researchcommons.org/regional-sustainability/vol2/iss1/1

This Full Length Article is brought to you for free and open access by Journals of EGI. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Regional Sustainability by an authorized editor of Journals of EGI. For more information, please contact
hyzhang@ms.xjb.ac.cn.

Regional Sustainability 2 (2021) 1–11

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Regional Sustainability
journal homepage: www.keaipublishing.com/en/journals/regional-sustainability

Full Length Article

Co-management of small-scale ﬁshery in the Tonle Sap
Lake, Cambodia
Serey Sok a, *, Xiaojiang Yu b
a
b

Research Ofﬁce, Royal University of Phnom Penh, Russian Federation Boulevard, Phnom Penh, 12150, Cambodia
School of Geosciences, University of Sydney, Sydney, 2006, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Keywords:
Small-scale ﬁshery
Co-management
Local planning process
Community ﬁshery
Tonle Sap Lake

In Cambodia, ﬁshery co-management is an important process to transfer authority and ownership
to the communities along the Tonle Sap Lake to manage ﬁshery. This paper aims to determine why
the co-management of small-scale ﬁshery has not been implemented satisfactorily in the Tonle Sap
Lake of Cambodia. The research was primarily based on a household survey among 404 households for quantitative data, equally divided between the Cham (202 households) and Khmer (202
households). Participatory process was also applied to collect qualitative data from key stakeholders. We found that limited interaction among the involved stakeholders, i.e., unequal distribution of authority and resources co-management, has impeded implementation. The engagement
of ﬁsherfolk was inﬂuenced by dependence on ﬁshery, law enforcement, and events organized by
the communities. While the Khmer had better opportunities to participate in planning at the
provincial and district levels, the Cham were only engaged in local development activities initiated
by their people. However, the latter evinced a higher rate of satisfaction due to their access to
ﬁshery resources and to a large quantity of ﬁshing gear. In the future, efforts should be made to:
(1) improve resource and authority sharing among all key stakeholders; (2) urgently resolve issues
pertinent to capacity building, insufﬁcient budgets for commune councils (CoCs) and community
ﬁshery (CFi); and (3) urge law enforcement regarding illegal ﬁshing.

1. Introduction
For more than two decades, ﬁshery co-management has been applied in the Tonle Sap Lake area, Cambodia. Now its ﬁsheries are
managed under a regime of community ﬁshery (CFi). The ﬁsherfolk are eligible to access, use and manage all ﬁsheries in accordance
with the CFi area. However, the involvement and partnership of all stakeholders in the co-management process are not yet clearly
deﬁned. In 1995, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) introduced the co-management concept in the form of a Participatory
Natural Resources Management Program in Siem Reap Province, Cambodia. Three years later, Oxfam Community Aid Abroad established community ﬁsheries (CFs) in Pursat Province, Cambodia. In 2001, a widespread co-management approach was adopted (Resurreccion, 2008). However, ﬁshery co-management has been hampered (i) by an increased trend towards decentralization (Ribot,
2002); and (ii) by dilemmas attributable to top-down governance (Driessen et al., 2012).
According to Pech and Sunada (2008), many conﬂicts have occurred involving lot owners and small-scale ﬁsherfolk who have been
pressured to relinquish their ﬁshing grounds to local management. With regards of the Tonle Sap Lake, the implications of ﬁshery
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co-management evolved in two stages of the national policy reforms. In 2001, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGoC) initially
transferred 5.00  105 hm2 or 56% of the large-scale commercial lot owners’ grounds to small-scale subsistence ﬁsherfolk. During the
second reform in March 2012, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) cancelled all ﬁshing lots nationwide and
handed them over to local communities for usage, management and conservation. Prior to the second reform, the Tonle Sap Lake
accommodated three ﬁshery scales, i.e., large, medium and small-scale ﬁshing (Hap et al., 2006). Co-management has been fully applied
through the establishment of CFi. By 2016, there were 516 CFs nationwide and 207 CFs (or 40% of the national total) had been
established in the Tonle Sap Lake area (MAFF, 2016).
Although 90% of the local people depend upon small-scale and subsistence ﬁshing for their food security (Hap et al., 2006), the
ﬁsherfolk have found little opportunity to participate in management. Subject to traditional overlapping and conﬂicting institutional
arrangements, ﬁshery management today is overshadowed by the government’s ﬁshery-associated dominant views (Pech and Sunada,
2008). Ratner (2006) argued that legal authorities and the rights and accountability of the ﬁshery ofﬁcials were required to strengthen
the effectiveness of CFi, whereas Nuon and Gallardo (2011) expressed optimism regarding the CFi’s operation to reduce illegal ﬁshing.
At the macro-level, ﬁshery management helps to increase economic, environmental and legal conditions. However, economic productivity at the individual level remains inconclusive (Elliott et al., 2020).
To date, scholarly work on ﬁshery management in the Tonle Sap Lake area has main focused upon the following aspects: governance
and participation (Bene and Neiland, 2006; Sneddon and Fox, 2007; Sok et al., 2014), women’s participation (Resurreccion, 2006),
institutional arrangements (Keskinen and Varis, 2012), social capital building (Sultana and Thompson, 2004), and enhancement of
resources through integrated resource management (Lambters, 2006). In the case of small-scale ﬁshery, co-management is arguably
more feasible given that it creates smaller group sizes and homogeneity of communities for collective actions (Olson, 1965). A study of
the co-management in the Tonle Sap Lake revealed that ﬁshery management is constrained by lack of linkage among state agencies,
community ﬁshery and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) when it comes to implementing relevant regulations, policies and
plans (Sok et al., 2012). In this paper, we try to determine why stakeholders from national to local levels have been unable to interact
successfully in general, and to identify the major factors inﬂuencing the ﬁsherfolk’s degree of participation in ﬁshery management. In
addition, the Cham and Khmer ﬁsherfolk’s perceptions regarding participation in and satisfaction with both the planning process and
implementation of regulations will be addressed. Finally, some future solutions will be suggested.
2. Revisiting co-management in the development world: towards an analytical framework
In the 1990s, the concept of co-management was introduced to recognize the signiﬁcance of the roles and responsibilities transferred by
the state to the communities for natural resource management (Lewins et al., 2014). The introduction of a centralized system has been
proven a challenge for authorities with very limited legitimacy to enforce regulations (Sen and Nielsen, 1996). This top-down approach has
failed to manage ﬁshery stocks effectively (Jentoft, 1989). Co-management is designed to integrate coordination and participation of
government and key stakeholders at various levels (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). While the establishment of co-management has been time
consuming (Kooiman, 2003), it has tasked local engagement with the managing of resource crises (de Oliveira, 2013).
According to Berkes (1994), co-management is a sharing of responsibilities and decision-making between the ﬁsherfolk and the
state-based management authorities. Moreover, co-management provides an opportunity to incorporate small-scale ﬁsherfolk and other
stakeholders in management (Noble, 2000). In the Cambodian context, co-management through the establishment of CFi has created a
partnership arrangement in which the community, government and NGOs share both the responsibility and authority for ﬁshery
management (MAFF, 2018). Similarly, Viner et al. (2006) deﬁned ‘co-management is being implemented through the creation of
community ﬁsheries; these involve management partnerships between a community of local resource users and the provincial ofﬁce of
ﬁsheries (POF), usually supported by a non-governmental organization (NGO)’. This deﬁnition is adopted in this study because it is
developed speciﬁcally for ﬁshery management in Cambodia.
Most of the developing countries inﬂuenced by international donors have introduced co-management reform in the interests of
sustainable management (Knowx and Meinzen-Dick, 2001). The government holds the strong perception that ﬁsherfolk are able to
formulate locally acceptable regulations designed to ﬁght overﬁshing trends (Ferguson and Derman, 2000). In Costa Rica of Central
American, the centralized management has been proved ineffective due to high rate of overexploitation; and the application of
co-management for exclusive access is an alternative (Lozano and Heinen, 2016). Additionally, participatory approaches to conservation
have failed because the work is mainly focused upon overall project goals rather than the means for achieving real issues (Campbell and
Vainio-Mattila, 2003).
In contrary, community-based conservation programs in Nepal were managed under the direction of NGOs and tended to perform
well because they fostered capacity building, local income generation, beneﬁt-sharing and more favorable attitudes (Baral and Stern,
2011). Decentralized conservation programs tend to be successful if governments legislate to promote empowerment, participation and
incentives structures (Baral and Heinen, 2007). Stern and Baird (2015) identiﬁed four types of trust (dispositional, rational, afﬁnitive
and systems-based) that contributes to play a role among networks of people and organizations to govern, debate and interact in
decision-making processes for natural resource management.
A well-known common-property researcher argues that self-organization is possible if collective action is shared (Ostrom, 1990). To
avoid dependence on government, Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) proposed establishing community co-management. Evans et al. (2011)
advocated ﬁnancial investment in ﬁshery co-management after conducting the requisite assessments. The ﬁrst comprehensive global
assessment revealed that leadership is a key factor in successful co-management (Gutierrez et al., 2011). Moreover, scholars have
emphasized the importance of co-management in social relationships (Pinkerton, 1989), citing the involvement of ﬁsherfolk in key
decisions regarding ﬁshing rights (Jentoft et al., 1998). Successful ﬁshery co-management variously requires: (1) an appropriate
2
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institutional framework for governance (Baland and Platteau, 1996); (2) a high degree of local control (Pinkerton, 1994); and (3) solid
relationships among human actors and informal arrangements (Pinkerton, 1989). Key elements of co-management consist of a degree of
power-sharing (Bene and Nieland, 2006), participation and involvement (Nunan et al., 2012; Smith, 2012), coordinating institutions
(Noble, 20020), empowerment and community beneﬁts (Napier et al., 2005).
Co-management involves empowering and the sharing of rights, roles and responsibilities of state agents, communities and interested stakeholders (Berkes et al., 1991; Sen and Nielsen, 1996; Castro and Nielsen, 2001; Pomeroy, 2004; Bene, 2009). Co-sharing tasks
between community and government makes co-management more effective than relying solely on state regulation (Carlsson and Berkes,
2005). Geoghegan and Renard (2002) maintained that while it is not essential for stakeholders to participate in management, their
views and interests are essential features of co-management. d’Armengola et al. (2018) argued that although co-management has put
considerable emphasis upon technical solutions to ﬁsheries’ management problems, it plays little attention to the socio-political factors
of local representatives.
In addition, ﬁshery co-management has been impeded by the following factors: (i) insufﬁcient attention to practice (Wilson, 2003;
Lewins et al., 2014; Quimby and Levine, 2018); (ii) inﬂexibility (Jentoft, 2003); and (iii) vagueness of the relevant information (Bown
et al., 2013). In the context of the Tonle Sap Lake, co-management has always been the sole responsibility of the government and is
mainly carried out by NGOs. However, sustainability remains an issue due to shortages of internal ﬁnancial and human resources. As a
result, analyses of key stakeholders’ participation in planning and regulation making, and engagement with ﬁsherfolk have become key
development agendas for supporting co-management in the Tonle Sap Lake.
3. Study area and methods
The Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia is the largest freshwater lake in Southeast Asia. It varies in size from approximately 2.50 
105–3.00  105 hm2 during the dry season to approximately 1.00  106–1.30  106 hm2 in the wet season (Kummu and Sarkkula,
2008). As Friend (2007) observed, the ﬁshing industry has sustained Cambodians over the centuries, accounting for 75% of animal
protein intake in a typical Cambodian diet (Ahmed, 2003). Cambodia claims to have the world’s most productive inland ﬁshery, largely
based on production from the Tonle Sap Lake and Mekong River (Thoun and Chambers, 2006). Its annual catch is conservatively
estimated at 4.00  105 t, approximately two-thirds of which comes from the Tonle Sap Lake (Hortle, 2007). Given its great freshwater
ecosystems, the lake is extraordinarily highly productive: it sustains enormous ﬁsh production and transport (van Zalinge, 2002).
According to Baran et al. (2007), the lake’s ﬁshery ranks the ﬁrst in terms of productivity and the fourth in terms of catch size in the
world. The Tonle Sap Lake is frequently considered ‘the heart’ of the Mekong River; and, almost half of all Cambodian people beneﬁt
from its rich resources (Bonheur, 2001).
The ﬁeld work for this study was conducted in one of the ﬁve provinces of the Tonle Sap Lake, i.e., Kampong Chhnang Province,
between November 2015 and April 2016. Additional interviews were conducted in March 2020 to facilitate collection of reliable

Fig. 1. Location of Kampong Tralach District in Kampong Chhnang Province, Cambodia (a), and distribution of the community ﬁshery (CFi) in the
Kompong Tralach District.
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qualitative data and to update information regarding ﬁshery management in the Tonle Sap Lake. Kampong Tralach District, which was
purposely selected for this research, is located approximately 37 km south of the capital of Kampong Chhnang Province (see Fig. 1).
Despite its very small land area, this district is home to the largest population in Kampong Chhnang Province. It is well-irrigated and has
a sound transport infrastructure. The majority of the people in the district are ﬁsherfolk working, either full-time or part-time. As Table 1
shows that, within the study area, 21 CFs were established in three communes: Longveaek, Kampong Tralach and Ampil Tuek, accounting for approximately 1.59  104 hm2.
The research methodology included: (1) a household survey for collecting quantitative data; and (2) employment of a participatory
approach (e.g., key informants, group discussions) for collecting qualitative data and random information. For the purposes of collecting
quantitative data, we interviewed a total of 404 households in the surveys, equally divided between the Cham (202 households) and
Khmer (202 households) groups (corresponding to the research of Yamane (1967)). In addition, group discussions with key informant
associations were organized, with the aim being to elicit qualitative information. To explore the roles of key stakeholders and local
engagement, we identiﬁed nine stakeholders in ﬁshery co-management as key informants (Appendix 1). The list of associations included
the Fishery Administration (FiA), District Administration of Kampong Tralach, Commune Councils (CoCs), CFs, Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT) and WorldFish. In addition, a group discussion between ﬁve Cham and ﬁve Khmer people was conducted to collect
qualitative data. The technique was used to gain insights and to rank constraints regarding local participation in ﬁshery co-management.
The Cham and Khmer interviewees were selected for the purposes of conducting a comparative study to investigate their degree of
engagement in ﬁshery co-management (see Table 2). In 2013, Cambodia was home to 14.70  106 people. The Khmer, who constituted
the majority group, accounted for 90.0% of the total national population (MoP, 2013). The Cham, one of Cambodia’s largest minority
groups (totaling 2.17  105 people), were spread throughout the country (Joshua Project, 2014). Kampong Tralach District has a total
population of 9.30  104 people or 2.14  104 households. It is home to two ethnic groups: the majority Khmer (77.6%) and the
minority Cham (22.4%) (District Planning Unit, 2016).
While the Cham villagers have established closed micro-societies (separate villages), they continue to maintain economic ties with
the Khmer. The majority of the Cham, who are recognized ﬁsherfolk, reside along the Mekong River in the vicinity of the Tonle Sap Lake.
They are highly skilled in the art of ﬁshing gear usage. The study district constitutes one of Cambodia’s highest Cham populations.
In quantitative analysis of the surveys, weighted average index (WAI) was applied to rate their degree of satisfaction with and
ﬁsherfolk participation in policies, laws and planning. Moreover, T-test analysis was also used to investigate different degrees of
satisfaction between the Cham and Khmer interviewees. Simultaneously, multiple regression was applied to discern if variables
signiﬁcantly contributed to ﬁsherfolk engagement in ﬁshery co-management and conservation. Qualitative data collected from key
informants and group discussion were used to analyze the key stakeholders in ﬁshery co-management.
4. Results
4.1. Key stakeholders in ﬁshery co-management
In managing ﬁsheries in Kampong Tralach District, government agencies, development partners, NGOs, CoCs and CFi are key
stakeholders. At the central level, the FiA of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) is responsible for the
Table 1
Number of community ﬁsheries (CFs) in Kompong Tralach District in 2016.
No.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Total

Commune

Longveaek

Kampong Tralach

Ampil Tuek

Village

Voat
Srah Chak
Boeng Kak
Neak Ta Hang
Kampong Tralach Leu
Samretthi Chey
Kampong Tralach Kraom
Preaek Kanlang
Kampong Kdar
Kien Roka
Kbal Kaoh
Kaek Pong
Baek Chan
Khla Krohuem
Bak Phnum
Veal Sbov
Kien Khleang
Ou Mal
Stueng Snguot
Ampil Tuek
Sdei Banlich

Area (hm2)

Name of CFs

Phum Voat
Srah Chak
Boeng Kak
Neak Ta Hang
Kampong Tralach Leu
Samretthi Chey
Kampong Tralach Kraom
Preaek Kanlang
Kampong Kdar
Kien Roka
Kbal Kaoh
Kaek Pong
Baek Chan
Khla Krohuem
Bak Phnum
Veal Sbov
Kien Khleang
Ou Mal
Stueng Snguot
Ampil Tuek
Sdei Banlich

Note: CFi, community ﬁshery. Source: MAFF (2016).
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1008
535
1358
566
727
265
446
552
601
388
647
314
649
502
178
331
296
243
3397
2384
510
15,897

Plan

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

CFi member
Total

Female

181
70
160
241
235
126
300
219
222
83
249
325
318
104
181
130
160
222
388
243
363
4520

85
36
76
133
77
44
140
90
71
49
135
201
145
55
98
60
70
131
202
129
184
2211

Registration date (dd/mm/yy)

30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
30/12/08
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Table 2
Characteristics of the cham and the Khmer.
Ethnic group

Characteristic

The Cham

About 50.5% of the Cham were full-time ﬁsherfolk.
The Cham owned less land but were more skilled at ﬁshing.
About 16.9% of the Khmer were full-time ﬁsherfolk.
The majority Khmer were full-time rice farmers.

The Khmer

Note: Source: Field survey (2016).

management and conservation of ﬁshery based on national ﬁshery laws and policies of Cambodia. The FiA commissioned three levels of
the provincial ﬁshery cantonment, the sectional ﬁshery authority and the Sangkat ﬁshery authority to oversee ﬁshing activities and to
control instances of perceived ﬁshery exploitation. In 2001, the FiA created the Department of Community Fisheries Development
(DCFD) to build technical capacity and manage CFs countrywide.
The main functions of the DCFD were to coordinate the relevant institutions, promote the establishment and operation of CFs, and
conduct monitoring, evaluation and research (KI-1 (KI, key informants) in Appendix 1). The FiA also worked with the development
partners to mobilize resources and collaborated with NGOs to build capacity and support the implementation of CFi. Between 2006 and
2009, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) supported the DCFD’s efforts to implement the Tonle Sap Environmental Management
Project. The aim of the project was to improve sustainable management and conservation of natural resources, and protect biodiversity
of the Tonle Sap Lake Biosphere Reserve (ADB, 2011). Within the communities, NGOs extensively supported the establishment and
operation of CFi. For example, NGOs directed and followed up the CFi’s daily tasks to ensure its effectiveness.
In December 2008, subsequent to the technical and ﬁnancial support of the DCFD and the ADB, a total of 21 CFs were established in
Kampong Tralach District. They operated as community-based organizations with the aims of (i) managing ﬁsh conservation areas or
reserves, and (ii) restoring habitats and ecosystems in accordance with the guidelines of the FiA and the rules formulated by the
ﬁsherfolk (KI-2 in Appendix 1). A Kampong Tralach Leu CFi committee member revealed that the MAFF’s approval of a CFs was based
upon: (i) the perceived level of ﬁshery dependence of the community; (ii) the availability of ﬁshing grounds; and (iii) the ﬁnancial
support and capacity building provided by the DCFD, the ADB and/or other NGOs (KI-3 in Appendix 1). The committee membership of
each CFi varied from 6 to 12 people. They were in charge of operation activities contrary to the CFs’ management plans. The tasks and
the responsibility for managing ﬁshery were shared by the ﬁshing CFs. The main tasks included organizing meetings, sharing information among members and monitoring illegal ﬁshing (KI-1 in Appendix 1).
Human resources and budgets were the main challenges to the operation of these community-based organizations. However, they
lacked the requisite expertise to carry out the proposed activities (KI-4 in Appendix 1). For example, after the completion of the ADB
projects, Ampil Tuek CFi was unable to carry out regular patrols and to organize awareness-raising programs appertaining to ﬁshery law
and the associated legal framework. In effect, the implementation of these tasks would not have been possible without the ﬁnancial and
technical support of NGOs. During the survey, we discovered that CFs could only undertake few activities which were mainly
participating in workshops or meetings organized by NGOs. Funding for CFs’ operations heavily relied on NGOs’ support because not all
CFs have generated their own revenues. The education levels of CFi committee members elected by the local ﬁsherfolk tended either to
be lower secondary or high school levels (KI-5 in Appendix 1). Moreover, the CFs were unable to raise the awareness and enhance the
capacity of the ﬁsherfolk without technical support or capacity building by NGOs.
In effect, the CFs and NGOs did little to enhance law enforcement and reduce illegal overﬁshing. Law enforcement became the
responsibility of ﬁshery ofﬁcers from the provincial ﬁshery cantonment. The sectional ﬁshery authority and Sangkat ﬁshery authority
played greater roles in managing ﬁshery and enforcing associated laws and regulations. However, their collaboration with the CFs and
NGOs was far from smooth when it came to eliminating illegal ﬁshing. For example, the CFs and NGOs found it was difﬁcult to get
ﬁshery ofﬁcers to: (i) discuss illegal ﬁshing at community meetings; (ii) share their concerns; and (iii) offer effective solutions (KI-3 in
Appendix 1). The chairperson of the Kampong Tralach Kraom CFi stated that the CFs worked closely with the NGOs and CoCs on ways of
resolving conﬂict over equal access to ﬁshery and the monitoring of illegal ﬁshing (KI-6 in Appendix 1). Both the CFi committee
members and the ﬁsherfolk preferred to report illegal ﬁshing to CoCs or NGOs for intervention rather than to ﬁshery ofﬁcers or the
police. That is because, based upon past experience, the ﬁsherfolk and CFi committee members realized that reporting illegal ﬁshing was
always ignored or ineffectively handled by both ﬁshery ofﬁcers and the police (KI-7 in Appendix 1).
4.2. Fisherfolk’s perceptions on planning, regulations and community
The ﬁsherfolk’s participation in planning and daily management activities had largely inﬂuenced their livelihoods. Given that the
Cham and Khmer can claim equal representation in the planning process at all levels, they are adequately equipped to ﬁnd solutions to
their concerns. The WAI was used to rate the degree of ﬁsherfolk participation in and satisfaction with planning and regulations. In
addition, T-test analysis was employed to test if the Cham and Khmer expressed different views regarding planning and regulations for
ﬁshery co-management of the communities located along the Tonle Sap Lake (see Table 3).
Overall, the Cham and Khmer evinced different levels of participation and satisfaction regarding provincial planning, district
planning, usage of ﬁshery resources, size of ﬁshing gear, establishment of the CFs, and community outreach. The Khmer had better
opportunities to take part in higher levels of meetings, e.g., provincial and district planning. They used high-level meetings as platforms
to express their concerns about and suggestions for improving ﬁshery management in their respective communities. At the community
5
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level, both the Cham and Khmer equally and widely participated in the planning process initiated by the CoCs and NGOs. They evaluated
a range of agreements and satisﬁed with most of all attributes apart from commune planning. In late 2015, the CoCs invited all of the
villagers, irrespective of whether they were the Cham or Khmer, to prioritize development activities including the commune investment
plan scheduled for 2016. Also, one representative from each household was invited to participate in ﬁshery management which was
considered a prioritized activity within their communities.
The Cham are especially family-oriented and not willing to travel out of their communities. Out of the 10 communes and 21 CFs in
Kampong Tralach District, the Cham managed 7 CFs in the Kampong Tralach commune. However, their connection to the NGOs,
Kampong Tralach District and provincial administrations could best be termed negligible. The Cham seemed highly satisﬁed with their
usage of ﬁshery resources, the size of the ﬁshing gear, CFi membership and community outreach. However, the Khmer complained
about the restrictions on ﬁshing grounds usage and frequently appealed for revision of the size and types of ﬁshing gear. The Cham’s
culture of helping each other, together with their higher dependence on ﬁshery resources for their livelihoods, motivated most of the
communities to become the CFi members.
The NGOs focused on the most vulnerable groups, and their plans were mostly directed towards the poor in the communities. The
CoCs and NGOs engaged with the Cham and Khmer equally and had undertaken their work mainly among the local people in the
communities. Some targeted groups among the NGOs, e.g., Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT), were invited to develop their action
plans for 2016. The FACT and the Coalition of Cambodia Fishers worked to assist the operations of the CoCs and CFs. Their action plans
included some activities proposed by the CoCs and CFi appertaining to ﬁshery management. Although several activities of the CFs were
integrated with commune investment plans, CoCs rarely allocated funds to these activities. Every year, each commune receives between
2.0  104 USD and 5.0  104 USD from the central government for development projects. The main portion of the budget is allocated to
infrastructure construction.
4.3. Factors inﬂuencing the participation of ﬁsherfolk in ﬁshery co-management
Four groups of attributes were considered useful to analyze if they have inﬂuenced the participation of ﬁsherfolk in ﬁshery management, which included: demography, ﬁshery-related economic activities, participation in meetings at various levels and law
enforcement. In line with all predictions, the results, i.e., a combination of ﬁve out of the 12 attributes, signiﬁcantly estimated the
engagement of ﬁsherfolk in ﬁshery management. Table 4 suggests that some attributes, e.g., ﬁshery contribution to household and
participation in community meetings, can make a signiﬁcant positive effect to the engagement. However, demographic factors, e.g., age,
education and ethnicity, are not signiﬁcantly associated with their engagement. This indicates that age, education and ethnicity are not
the main factors inﬂuencing the ﬁsherfolk participating in ﬁshery management.
The model predicts the positive ﬁshery contribution to household and participation in community meetings. The contribution of
ﬁshery to the livelihoods of householders invariably inﬂuences the ﬁsherfolk’s degree of engagement. The prediction tends to suggest
that the higher the degree of ﬁshery dependency for household, the greater the opportunity for ﬁsherfolk to participate in local ﬁshery
management events. The ﬁsherfolk believe that ﬁshery can be sustainable and provide a long-term livelihood support only when the
communities are playing very important roles in ﬁshery management. The effective ﬁshery management helps to secure their food
security in the future. The engagement of ﬁsherfolk is likely to be enhanced by the availability of community meetings. Regular
community meetings are monthly or quarterly organized by CoCs, NGOs and CFs. At these meetings, concerned parties discuss key
issues, listen to concern expressed about topics such as illegal ﬁshing, and raise awareness of ﬁshery management. This model suggests
that when meetings are regularly organized in the communities, there will be a strong likelihood of enhanced ﬁsherfolk engagement in
ﬁshery management.
The same model also suggests that attributes, e.g., primary job as ﬁsherfolk, restrictions on ﬁshing gear, and arrest by ﬁshery ofﬁcers,
had some negative contributions to engage the ﬁsherfolk in ﬁshery management. Nevertheless, full-time ﬁsherfolk were unlikely to be
actively engaged in ﬁshery management. For those who rely on ﬁshery as their primary source of income, they are reluctant to discuss
topics like restrictions on gear and illegal ﬁshing. Some full-time ﬁsherfolk confessed to feeling very guilty when participating in events
organized by CFs, NGOs or the provincial ofﬁcer of ﬁshery. Some hesitantly admitted that during their respective lifetimes, they had
personally used illegal ﬁshing gear. Some had earlier been arrested by maritime ofﬁcers for breaching ﬁshery laws. Many full-time
Table 3
Degree of ﬁsherfolk participation in and satisfaction with planning and regulations.
Attribute

Provincial planning
District planning
Commune planning
NGOs planning
Usage of ﬁshery resources
Size of ﬁshing gears
CFi’s membership
Community outreach

Khmer (n ¼ 202)

Cham (n ¼ 202)

WAI

OA

WAI

OA

Overall (n ¼ 404)
WAI

OA

0.45
0.48
0.66
0.51
0.49
0.54
0.53
0.52

M
M
H
M
M
M
M
M

0.37
0.45
0.67
0.52
0.58
0.61
0.62
0.58

L
M
H
M
M
H
H
M

0.41
0.46
0.66
0.51
0.49
0.54
0.54
0.52

M
M
H
M
M
M
M
M

P-value

0.000***
0.005**
0.416
0.670
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***
0.000***

Note: WAI, weight average index (L, less (0.21–0.40); M, moderate (0.41–0.60); H, high (0.61–0.80)); OA, overall assessment; **, signiﬁcance at the
0.01 level; ***, signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level.
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Table 4
Inﬂuencing attributes on ﬁsherfolk’s respond to ﬁshery management.
Attribute

B

Standard error

β

t-value

P-value

Age
Education attainment
Ethnicity (Khmer or Cham)
Number of male ﬁsherfolk
Number of female ﬁsherfolk
Primary job as ﬁsherfolk
Fishery contribution to household
Participation in national meetings
Participation in regional meetings
Participation in community meetings
Restrictions on ﬁshing gear
Arrest by ﬁshery ofﬁcers

0.029
0.169
1.366
0.505
0.316
7.444
12.851
4.753
3.369
11.975
15.611
4.535

0.045
0.152
1.107
0.617
0.925
1.227
1.419
8.195
6.693
3.495
3.986
1.957

0.025
0.044
0.052
0.033
0.013
0.269
0.432
0.043
0.039
0.167
0.182
0.088

0.645
1.107
1.234
0.818
0.341
6.069
9.057
0.580
0.503
3.426
3.916
2.317

0.519
0.269
0.218
0.414
0.733
0.000***
0.000***
0.562
0.615
0.001**
0.000***
0.021*

Note: B is the unstandardized coefﬁcient and it was generated from the natural units of each variable; β is the standardized coefﬁcient which was
estimated by standardizing the variables before running the regression. The t-value and P-value were used to test the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcient
is 0; either of these two statistics indicated the signiﬁcance of the selected independent variables. *, signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level; **, signiﬁcance at the
0.01 level; ***, signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level. All 12 attributes were derived from a total sample size of 404 households.

ﬁsherfolk had invested considerable amounts of money in ﬁshing gear and paid bribes to both the police and ﬁshery ofﬁcers in exchange
for using oversized ﬁshing gear. Whereas for those who rely on ﬁshery as their secondary job, they preferred to catch ﬁsh in the vicinity
of their homes; full-time ﬁsherfolk frequently traveled miles to ﬁshing grounds in other districts or in neighboring provinces.
5. Discussion
5.1. Constraints impeding interaction between key stakeholders and ﬁshery co-management
The research has discovered that co-management has been weakened by unequal sharing of authority and responsibility. Based on
the deﬁnitions by Viner et al. (2006) and MAFF (2018), the emergence of broader interaction among stakeholders in the ﬁshery
management of the Tonle Sap Lake, occurred when co-management was ofﬁcially adopted as a national policy in the 2000s. But, interactions among CFs, ﬁshery ofﬁcers and the police are limited due to the fact that only responsibilities are transferred from the
governments. However, the ﬁsherfolk, CoCs and CFs don’t have any authorities of ﬁnancial/human resources, and decision-making.
When developing laws, policies and planning strategies, the FiA invites stakeholders to participate in consultation.
However, decision-making largely remains in the hands of the central government. Many of the concerns raised and suggestions
proposed by the ﬁsherfolk are not addressed in the ﬁnal decision-making process. During the formulation of regulations, for example,
ﬁsherfolk, CoCs and CFs, are granted temporary rights to detain illegal ﬁshing offenders pending the arrival of the authorities. In reality,
however, the ﬁsherfolk are only allowed to inform the relevant ofﬁcers about illegal ﬁshing. They have no rights to detain offenders. As a
result, the offenders ﬂee the scene before the ofﬁcers or police arrive. In addition, CFs and CoCs mainly work to support activities
implemented by the DCFD and NGOs.
Lack of sufﬁcient funding limits many local communities’ abilities to fulﬁll their roles and responsibilities. From the experiences in
Nepal (Baral and Stern, 2011; Stern and Baird, 2015), it is noted that NGOs play important roles in supporting the Community-based
Organization (CBOs) for natural resource management. In the study area, NGOs have both good human and ﬁnancial resources, and they
fulﬁll their tasks well. However, most of their tasks are short-term. Also, NGOs’ relationships with the DCFD are not always congenial.
For this reason, the missions they pursue often are dependent upon external helpers and/or humanitarian agencies. The CFs’ development activities cease when the DCFD and NGOs no longer allocate funding to the communities. Co-management cannot be achieved if
CoCs and CFs are not equipped with sufﬁcient resources, or if NGOs are not authorized to work in support of local communities. The
central government is considering allocating an annual budget to the CFs through a commune investment plan designed to support basic
activities, i.e., patrols, community meetings and transportation.
During a group discussion convened in Kampong Tralach District, the ﬁsherfolk proposed that the ﬁshing grounds managed by the
CFs should be zoned into a protected area with open ﬁshing and cooperative ﬁshing grounds. Because cooperative ﬁshing grounds are
open to public auction, the resultant income could be used for CFi operations. According to a FACT ofﬁcial, CFs were unable to collect
membership fees and integrate their activities into a commune investment plan (CIP) for mobilizing an annual budget to ﬁnance the
management plans. In case where activities which were already integrated with the CIP, CoCs did not allocate the annual budget that
would support CFs implementation of the management plan. As a result, NGOs were the main funding sources supporting the implementation of the CFi’s management plans (KI-8 in Appendix 1). At the same time, NGOs and the DCFD could continue to promote
awareness, capacity building and advocacy campaigns. We would like to emphasize that roles and responsibilities can work effectively
only if resources and authority are equally distributed among all stakeholders in ﬁshery co-management.
5.2. Development of ﬁsherfolk’s livelihoods and law enforcement
The policy reforms introduced in 2000 and 2012 have proven to be very important milestones in ﬁshery co-management in
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Cambodia. Their introduction allowed ﬁsherfolk to establish CFs as community-based organizations. Sub-Decree on Community Fishery
Management and Fishery Law, which was formulated in 2006, incudes the monitoring of illegal ﬁshing in the Tonle Sap Lak. The law is
jointly enforced by the provincial ﬁshery cantonment, the sectional ﬁshery authority and the Sangkat ﬁshery authority. The ﬁshery law
recognizes local authorities, in particular CoCs, as collaborating partners in law enforcement. The law also provides a means of ensuring
that members of the local police force have sufﬁcient authority to deal with illegal ﬁshing. The CFs have formulated internal regulations
in the ﬁshery law with which members and others must comply upon entering ﬁshing grounds (KI-7 in Appendix 1). However, the
question remains: why is illegal ﬁshing still rampant in the Tonle Sap Lake when so many institutions from national to local levels are
working to implement ﬁshery management?
During the group discussion, ﬁsherfolk identiﬁed two of the main reasons behind the failure: (1) the ﬁsherfolk’s low capability to
survive; and (2) the bribing of involved ofﬁcers. Several ﬁsherfolk admitted that they could not earn enough to survive due to the current
limitations on ﬁshing gear, ﬁshing grounds, and the high cost of equipment and gasoline. To comply with the current limitations on
ﬁshing gear, the ﬁsherfolk could only use seine nets that does not exceed 400 m. The harsh reality is that the ﬁsherfolk ﬁnd it is difﬁcult
to survive irrespective of net size. Small-scale ﬁsherfolk are left with two options only: (1) bribing the relevant ofﬁcers; and (2) engaging
in illegal ﬁshing. When implementing the management plan, the CFs were responsible for conducting patrols to oversee illegal activities,
but they obtained little support from the provincial ﬁshery cantonment, i.e., the sectional ﬁshery authority when dealing with illegal
offenders. They claimed that they had insufﬁcient staff and equipment to conduct patrols with CFs (KI-4 in Appendix 1).
Up-to-date, the ﬁsherfolk are facing to the rapid declines of ﬁshery when the operation of CFs is constrained by insufﬁcient powersharing (Bene and Nieland, 2006), limited local control (Pinkerton, 1994), and lower degree of empowerment (Napier et al., 2005) to
manage resource effectively. At Kampong Tralach commune, the ﬁsherfolk complained about a perceived ineffective crackdown on
illegal ﬁshing and corruption. In earlier times, there were ﬁshing lots. Fishing lot owners had to adhere to certain regulations and
instructions issued by the FiA. After the ﬁshing grounds opened in March 2012, illegal ﬁshing became more widespread, almost out of
control. As a result, the annual catch by small-scale ﬁsherfolk has dramatically reduced in size.
The introduction of various larger-scale illegal ﬁshing events involving local elites has also impacted deleteriously on the ﬁsherfolk.
Although some of these events occurred in the daytime, legal action was not taken unless direct orders came from ﬁshery ofﬁcers. These
powerful elitists always know the patrol plan in advance; frequently, someone leaked the patrol information to the ﬁsherfolk. When
forewarned, the offenders could temporarily postpone their illegal ﬁshing activities for a few days (GD (group discussion) in Appendix 1). When the ﬁsherfolk informed the relevant ofﬁcers about the high incidence of illegal ﬁshing, patrols were either delayed or
ignored. Conversely, the ofﬁcials always acted immediately against poor ﬁsherfolk who used traps and/or other forms of banned gear for
subsistence ﬁshing. When action was taken against those using banned gear, the charges were more likely to be directed towards smallscale ﬁsherfolk. The latter were unable to pay bribes to ofﬁcials patrolling illegal ﬁshing practices (KI-2 in Appendix 1).
5.3. Participation of the Cham and Khmer
Based on the ﬁndings of our study, there are three parts to the co-management: (1) components of management; (2) key stakeholders; and (3) a participatory process. Key stakeholders, e.g., the government, NGOs, CoCs and CFs, are working to promote sustainable livelihoods and ﬁshery management. A satisfactory outcome will depend upon components of management and a successful
participatory process. The latter will depend upon a management mechanism. The striking of a balance between ﬁshery conservation
and livelihood development requires a carefully considered level of sustainable management. The study conﬁrms that the respective
degrees of engagement of the Cham and Khmer will be determined by: (1) their respective degrees of dependence upon ﬁshery for their
livelihoods; (2) the availability of development activities in the communities; and (3) law enforcement. The ﬁndings in Table 3
distinguish the degree of participation of the two ethnic groups in ﬁshery co-management. While the Cham had fewer opportunities to
participate in district and provincial planning, they expressed higher satisfaction regarding usage of ﬁshery resources and size of ﬁshing
gear.
The existing studies reveal that decentralized conservation programs and local beneﬁts (Baral and Heinen, 2007) improve the
engagement of communities in development activities. In the case of the Tonle Sap Lake, a higher proportion of the Cham were full-time
ﬁsherfolk. The Khmer were considered part-time ﬁshers. At Kampong Tralach commune, where the villagers were very actively involved
in community development, projects were invariably initiated by community members (e.g., the CFs committees). They helped their
neighbors and friends by sharing their experiences of ﬁshing and disseminating awareness of ﬁshery management.
However, they have chosen not to established close relationships with the NGOs and authorities in general, particularly at the
district, provincial and central levels. In contrast, where ﬁshery management was concerned, the Khmer established a better connection
with the district and provincial governments. The Cham were less likely to become involved in the formulation of laws, policies and
regulations. Within the study communities, the Cham preferred to gather together to discuss religious issues. Economic development
seemed not a priority. The Khmer were more willing to participate in economic events organized by NGOs and government agencies at
both regional and national levels. Their participation inﬂuenced the development of a legal framework.
5.4. Suggestions about future actions
In order to increase the effectiveness of ﬁshery co-management in the Tonle Sap Lake area, the authorities should share national
programs and resources with the CFs to enable the latter to work independently and on a long-term basis. The authors strongly
recommend as the following: ﬁrst, the DCFD should provide the CFs with political and legal support by transferring more authority and
sufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources. The CFs should be eligible to conﬁscate illegal activities and the CFi committee may include some
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members from the police and CoCs. Moreover, the CFs should also be allocated an annual budget through commune investment budget
that will allow them to carry out key activities independently. As an example, the human and ﬁnancial resources for patrol should be
available for 15 d per month at least, which is aligned to World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) guideline for effective ﬁshery management. As a result, the CFs could be expected to perform much better in their daily management duties, such as the organization of
regular community meetings, investigation of illegal ﬁshing and the solving of any committee problems. Second, local revenue of CFi
should be collected through membership fees with the restriction of ﬁshing activities by non-members of CFs. The CFs should collect fees
for the entry of ﬁshing ground in a CFi area. Also, the CFs should be able to earn local revenues through CBOs, such as saving group and
eco-tourism initiative. Third, the authority of CFs in decision-making should be automatically shared or transferred as the CFs have
enough human and ﬁnancial resources. Fourth, the engagement of the Cham in planning and policy implementation should be further
encouraged, especially their participation in meetings and consultation at both regional and national levels. To achieve this, we
recommend that a great effort should be made towards raising the public participation awareness of the Cham.
6. Conclusions
Based on our primary ﬁndings and discussion, we conclude that ﬁshery co-management has been constrained by insufﬁcient
interaction among the involved stakeholders, seemingly due to uneven sharing of authority and resources. In the case of the communities domiciled along the Tonle Sap Lake, CoCs and CFs emerged as the core agents working closely with the ﬁsherfolk. However, they
lacked sufﬁcient human and ﬁnancial resources for implement the CFi mismanagement plans. Without sufﬁcient resources, both CoCs
and CFs were unable to fulﬁll their tasks. They could only support some development activities organized by government agencies and
NGOs. Factors such as dependence on ﬁshery for livelihood development, law enforcement, and events organized in the communities
greatly contributed to the engagement of ﬁsherfolk in co-management. Fisherfolk were more actively involved in the activities launched
by local governments, NGOs and CoCs in the communities. The relevant events organized at provincial and regional levels had little
inﬂuence on the local ﬁsherfolk, particularly on the Cham. To achieve better ﬁshery co-management in the future, we recommend that
resources and authority should be equally shared among all key stakeholders. As well, issues of capacity building, insufﬁcient budgets
for CoCs and CFs, and law enforcement on illegal ﬁshing must be urgently addressed.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing ﬁnancial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to
inﬂuence the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
This study is under the ﬁnancial support from MK32 Mekong Fellowship and it is a part of Consultative Group for International
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) research program on Water, Land and Ecosystems. We are thankful for the Royal University of Phnom
Penh to provide institutional support in the research. The authors greatly appreciate the editorial board of the journal and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on this paper; and Dr. Estelle Dryland and Ms. Diana McCosker at Macquarie University, Sydney for their language editing. Also, the authors gratefully acknowledge Mr. Kanharith Samath, Mr. Boromey Samath and
Mr. Sok Sela for assisting in the ﬁeldwork and data collection.
Appendix

Appendix 1. Lists of key informants (KI), in-depth organization and group discussion (GD)

Code

Organization

Interview date

KI-1
KI-2
KI-3
KI-4
KI-5
KI-6
KI-7
KI-8
GD

Fishery Administration, Phnom Penh Ofﬁce
Kampong Tralach Commune, Kampong Tralach District, Kampong Chhnang Province
Kampong Tralach Leu CFi (community ﬁshery), Kampong Tralach District, Kampong Chhnang Province
Ampil Tuek CFi, Kampong Tralach District, Kampong Chhnang Provinc
Fisheries Action Coalition Team, Phnom Penh Ofﬁce
Kampong Tralach Kraom CFi, Kampong Tralach District, Kampong Chhnang Province
WorldFish, Phnom Penh Ofﬁce
District Ofﬁce, Kampong Tralach District, Kampong Chhnang Province
Fisherfolk, Kampong Tralach Commune, Kampong Tralach District, Kampong Chhnang Province

April 2016
January 2016
March 2016
March 2020
March 2020
March 2016
April 2012
January 2016
February 2016
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